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I. INTRODUCTION
If the old maxim is true, that "all politics is local," then even more so is
2
the principle true that all public education is loca1. Recent case law developments also suggest that plaintiffs who are unhappy about a problem in education
are increasingly seeking relief from local legal resources, such as going to state
3
court to litigate state law matters, rather than seeking relief under federal law.
•

*
Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A. DePauw University; M.Ed. Valparaiso University; J.D. Indiana University Indianapolis. I extend my many
thanks to my research assistants who kept all these statutes straight and up-to-date: Katherine
Lord, Lori Marschke, and Chuck Waller.
I

"Our citizenship in the United States is our national character. Our citizenship in any particular state is only our local distinction. By the latter we are known at home, by the fonner to the
world." Thomas Paine, The Last Crisis (April 19, 1783), in THE SELECI'ED WORK OF TOM PAINE
86 (Howard Fasted., Duell, Sloan & Pearce 1945) (emphasis added).
2

"By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,104 (1968); Tinkerv. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
3

One of the starkest examples of the switch from the relative toothlessness of federal litigation to the power of the "local option" of state litigation is in school funding equity cases. After
plaintiffs failed to receive relief from Texas's state and local funding legislation in federal court
and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in San Antonio Independent
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A similar trend is increasingly apparent in privacy cases: State constitutions are
becoming the refuge for privacy protection if the federal courts are viewed as
sidestepping the issue, at least in matters of Fourth Amendment search and sei4
zure jurisprudence and of decisional privacy. Such a development is also increasingly likely in the confluence of education and privacy problems in matters
of education informational privacy, especially privacy of student records. Plaintiffs will abandon litigation under federal laws because those laws are ineffective and instead will enforce their privacy rights under state law~
State privacy laws have proved more effective at protecting privacy for
at least three reasons. First, they typically create an affirmative right to privacy.
Next, states are more willing to vociferously protect their citizens' privacy
rights. Last, these statutes are more likely to be privately enforceable by individuals. Thus, school districts have more to fear from state privacy laws and
the growing trend toward state litigation than they do from federal laws. Hence,
this Article will attempt to examine major areas of state privacy law - constitutions, statutes, and regulations - to which school districts must be attentive
5
when dealing with student records.
Part II will review the backdrop for plaintiffs' abandoning federal laws
for state law protections over student record privacy. Part m will examine state
constitutional privacy provisions, where states have made privacy a fundamental
right. Part N will take up specifically dedicated state statutes and regulations
that provide privacy protection to student records. Last, Part V will deal with
exemptions in state sunshine laws that protect student record privacy. This Article is designed to educate about this little known but increasingly important
6
niche in privacy protection for the records of public schoolchildren, and to alert
school districts that observing federal privacy laws may no longer be enough
protection from litigation ..
.

.

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),. they were measurably more successful in attack~
ing the same legislation in the Texas. state court and under the. Texas Constitution in Edgewood
Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). See also Ken Gormley, One
Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1335, 1420-1422 (1992) [hereinafter Gonnley; 100
Years].
4

See Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy &: the States, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1279,
1280 (1992); Gormley, 100 Years, supra note 3, at 1423-25.

5

·There is, unfortunately, little way that an Article such as this can address all the individual
state privacy laws that might protect student records. As soon as this piece is published, some
state will amend its statutes or enact a new one. However, this Anicle observes trends and warns
about general categories of concern. This Article will also not address the privacy issues raised by
the various states' military access statutes that require schools to give personal information to
military recruiters. As of the writing of this Article, those statutes may be subject to challenge
pending the Supreme Court's decision on the federal version of the military access statute in F orumjor Academic & Institutional Rights v. .Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cen. granted,
125 S. Ct. t 977 (2005).
6

This Article is limited to the student records of K-12 public school students although higher
education privacy protections may be addressed tangentially and as exemplars when K-12 analogies and. cases are absent.
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IT. BACKGROUND
Until recently, school districts and other authorities considered federal
law the primary source of protection for the privacy of public school records.
7
O.ne such source of solace was the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.
A statute ostensibly enacted to protect student and family privacy in public
school records, FERPA provides proce,d ures for the limited disclosure of and
8
access to "education records," Any school district with a·policy or practice of
9
defying these procedures may lose its federal · funding. Although there was
some debate, whether FERPA was actually a privacy statute or merely a funding
11
10
statute, Gonzaga University v. Doe rendered that distinction virtually moot
for an individual's, privacy right~ In that case, the Supreme Court of the United
States determined that FERPA provides no personal rights to persons seeking to
12
As a consequence, children
enforce the privacy "promised'' by the statute.
(and their parents) who believe their privacy has been compromised by nonconsensual disclosure of or access to their student records will search for alternative
recourse for protection.. State laws are the likely candidates for that recourse~
Gonzaga University v. Doe is instructive in this manner because plaintiff Do,e - although unsuccessful on his, FERP,A claim - did prevail on his state
13
law claim for the common law tort of invasion of privacy. So too might other
individuals who alternatively plead state law claims when seeking a remedy for
a breach of privacy occasioned by an unlawful disclosure of student records.
Indeed, some of these state law claims could provide more than just minimal
injunctive relief; plaintiff Doe was awarded over $100,000 for invasion of privacy!4
However, this Article is not exclusively about litigation; it is also about
compliance with the law. The general privacy resource that school districts re7

20 U.S.C. § I232g (2000).,

8

Id. § 1232g(a)(4).
/d. § 1232g(b)(I).

9

°

1

Compare Unincorporated Operating Div. oflnd. Newspapers, Inc. v. Trs. oflnd. Univ., 787
N.E.2d 893, 903-04 (Ind. Ct. Ap,p. 2003) (FERPA requires that student records be kept confidential) with Red & Black Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 427 S.E~2d 257, 261 (Ga. 1993) (FERPA
does not prohibit disclosure of student records; it only regulates funding based on policies of
releasing student records).
11
536 u.s. 273 (2002).
12
ld. at 287.,
13
14

Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390 (2001), rev'din part, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).

Id. Doe prevailed on his invasion of privacy claim regarding the internal investigation of
his alleged misconduct that eventually led Gonzaga University to refuse to give the moral character affidavit Doe needed to obtain his teaching certification. ld. at 399-400. This particular type
of invasion of privacy is not one that a student might traditionally pursue for unlawful disclosure
of student records. However, Doe's victory does stand for the proposition that plaintiffs might
seek and be awarded more than de minimis damages under state law claims for invasion of privacy
rather than the administrative slap on the hand threatened by FERPA.
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ceive for creating local privacy policies_usually derives from Guidances issued
by the Department of Education that are, perforce, incomplete because they are
only about federal laws, and not about state laws. Those Guidances can be misleading because federal laws do not protect student privacy welL Thus, this
Article is intended to serve notice that the Guidances do not, that numerous state
law~ - constitutions: in particular- demand more privacy protection from school
districts than federal laws demand. School districts must note that local distinction and prepare for protecting the greater privacy demanded by their respective
.

.

state~

States may not legislate fewer rights than afforded by the United States
Constitution, but they may and have legislated greater rights than afforded by
15
the Constitution. In particular, states have created greater rights with resp·e ct
to privacy in contrast to federal law. The Supreme Court has not unequivocally
determined that privacy exists or is protected under the Constitution . Indeed, it
is not even clear that the Supreme Court recognizes a right to informational pri16
vacy, a specific privacy right that would afford protection for student records.
Furthermore, federal legislation purporting to protect such student informational
17
privacy has more holes than a sieve. As_a consequence, state laws - constitutions, statutes, regulations, common law - can be daubed in the holes to protect
18
student privacy where. the Constitution and federal laws cannot or will not.
Part of the problem school districts face in this area is that state privacy
laws have not always been given their due as most people have been enamored
with the federal statutes, especially FERPA. However, school districts who put
all their privacy eggs in the federal basket may still have problems with their
local statutes and constitutions becaus_e of the absolute absence of any genuine
15

States may provide greater rights than those afforded by the Constitution, especially liberty
interests (ofwhich privacy is arguably one). See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982).
16

See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public
~ector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV . .553, 574-76 ( 1994-95).
17

See, e.g., Susan P. Stuart, Lex-Praxis of Education Informational Privacy for Public Schoolchildren, 48 NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Stuart, Lex-Praxis].
18

There seems to be no conflict in recognizing .g reater privacy rights granted by state law than
offered by federal law. The Supremacy Clause only requires preemption of state law by federal
law when there exists an explicit indication of preemption by Congress, when it is a physical
impossibility to comply with both state and federal law at the. same time, or when state law is an
obstacle to the federal purpose. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., C.T.S. Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78-79 (1987); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan .Ass"n v. de Ia Cuesta, 458
U ..S. 141, 152-53 (1982). Little is suggested in any of the applicable federal privacy statutes that
any such conflicts would arise in matters of states' granting privacy rights to its citizens, particularly in expanding liberty interests (of which privacy is arguably one). See, e.g., Mills, 457 U.S. at
300. The only exception appears to be that state privacy rights may have to give way to federal
discovery requests. See, e.g., Mem'l Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadut, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063...
64 (7th Cir. 1981) (unauthorized disclosure provisions of state medical records statute preempted
by discovery request in federal antitrust case); United States ex rei. Agency for lnt'l Dev. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Md., 866 F._Supp. 884, 886-87 (D. Md. 1994) (procedures in state confidential
records act preempted by federal agency subpoena power).
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9

privacy protections in federal statutes.• School districts may be forgiven this
misunderstanding as the federal government, especially the Department of Education, has insinuated itself more and more into the regulation of education, and
school districts and school boards have forgotten what "local control'' really is.
However, their constituents have not forgotten nor have their lawyers.
Ill. STATE CONSTITUTIONS: PRIVACY AS FuNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Unlike the United States Constitution, a handful of state constitutions
specifically use the word "privacy" in their provisions. Others, like the C_onsti20
tution, have been interpreted to include privacy within their ''penumbras."
These provisions - whether express or implied - and the resulting interpretive
case law have been characterized as a "laboratory" for the protection of privacy
21
rights. Although some explicit provisions have been around since statehood,
others have been added as the Supreme Court has grown more conservative and
22
Thus, states have been amending
less inclined to recognize privacy rights.
23
their constitutions to create new privacy rights in recent decades. Similarly,
other states have discovered penumbral privacy in more general provisions of
24
their respective constitutions during the same time period.
These provisions
and judicial interpretations were originally designed to expand Fourth Amend25
These implicit provisions of
ment and decisional-autonomy privacy rights.
privacy, along with the explicit provision, have become shelter for informational
privacy and therefore are a potential source for protecting student records.

A.

Explicit Constitutional Privacy Rights

Unlike the United States Constitution, ten states have constitutions providing explicit privacy rights that could afford protection to personal infonna26
27
29
30
28
31
tion. Those states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawai' i,

19

I posit in a separate article that there is an absolute privacy protection under the Constitution. Susan P. Stuart, Fun with Dick and Jane and Lawrence: A Primer on Education Privacy as
Constitutional Liberty, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 563 (2004) [hereinafter Stuart, Primer]~
20

See generally Gormley, 100 Years, supra note 3.

21

/d. at 1428-31.

22

/d. at 1423-25.

23

/d.

24

See infra text accompanying notes 92-129.

25

Gormley, 100 Years, supra note 3 at 1425.

26

Id. at 1423-24; Gormley & Hartman, supra note 4, at 1282-83. This list does not include

those- states whose constitutions provide a specific right to privacy to crime victims: IDAHO
CONST. art.l, § 22; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; N.M. CONST. art. II,§ 24; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9m.
27

''The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed ...." ALASKA
CONST. art. l, § 22 (emphasis added).
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Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina,J and Washington.
Although the language in some of these provisions clearly reflects Fourth

lllinois,

Amendment-type protections from warrantless searches and seizures, nearly all
of them expressly or impliedly cover more than that. For example, the South
Carolina Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
37
and unreasonable invasions of privacy
More broadly, the majority of
these explicit provisions protect an unadulterated, more overarching right to
privacy: "[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed''38 or "[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
39
interest.," Florida's Constitution has one of the most expansive privacy provisions: ~'Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided
't

• • •"

28

"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority
of law.'' ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8 (emphasis added).
29

''All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).
30

"Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into
the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed
to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law~" FLA.
CoNST. art. 1, § 23 (emphasis added).
31

"The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest ..•." HAw. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6 (emphasis added).
32

"The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses~ papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means . . . ." ILL. CaNST. art. 1, § 6 (emphasis
added).
33

"Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. ~ .." LA. CaNST. art. 1, §
5 (emphasis added).
34

"The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not
be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." MoNT. CoNST. art. 2, § 10 (emphasis added).
35

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated ...
." S.C. CaNST. art. I~ § 10 (emphasis added).

36

"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority
of law.'' WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (emphasis added).
37

S.C. CONST. an. I, § 10; see also ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5. A shorter
variation exists in Arizona's and Washington's Constitutions: "No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8; WASH.
CoNST. art l, § 7.
38

ALASKA CONST~ art. 1, § 22; HAW. CONST. art.

39

MONT. CoNS1. art. 2, § 10.

1, § 6.
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herein. ,,4o This greater coverage is significant because, unlike the Constitution,
these state constitutions either do or can unequivocally protect information privacy~

Even more significant is the emphasis the state courts put on these explicit constitutional provisions when they interpret privacy as a state-endowed
41
fundamental right. One state constitution itself even ascribes inalienability to
42
this privacy right.
At the state level, this particular explicit right shares the
protections inuring to the rights and freedoms of speech, religion, and association. Consequently, this right of privacy does not suffer the incertitude assigned
to a federal, constitutional right of privacy,. Instead, what is also fairly universal
in most of these jurisdictions is the certitude that state constitutional privacy
43
rights are greater than federal constitutional privacy rights.
For instance, Alaska's constitutional privac.y protects marijuana posses44
sion in one's own home. Similarly, Arizona's constitutional provision protects
45
the right to refuse medical treatment, and hence protects the right to die. C,a lifomia has even extended protection over its citizens' privacy by interpreting its
46
constitution to apply to private intrusions, not just to governmental intrusions.
Because of this explicit language and expansive interpretation, these
courts have expanded these state constitutional privacy provisions to protect the
right to autonomy and the right to be left alone and, thus, to protect infortna48
47
tional privacy, decision-making privacy, and Fourth Amendment physical
49
privacy.
Thus, some state courts have afforded expansive privacy rights under these explicit provisions that are difficult to attain in federal constitutional
decisions. One court used such a provision to stake out a broad area of coverage
40

FLA. CONST.

art. 1, § 23.

See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. D~B., 784 So. 2d 585, 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 200'1);
State, Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. McCorkle, 694 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Armstrong v.
State, 989 P.2d 364, 373-74 (Mont. 1999). See generally Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940
P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997).
42
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
41

43

See, e.g., Lungren, 940 P.2d at 808; Commitment of Smith v. State, 827 So. 2d 1026, 1030
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Bd. of County Comm'rs, 784 So~- 2d at 588; State v. K~ 748 P.2d
372, 377 (Haw. 1988); A.G. Edwards, Inc~ v. Sec'y of State, 772 N.E.2d 362, 369 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002); People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 298 (Ill. 2004); State v. Vikesdal, 688 So. 2d 685,
691 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Armstrong v. State, 989 P~2d at 373-74; State v., McKinney, 60 P.3d 46,
49 (Wash. 2002).
44

State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 94 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the provision "protects an adult's right to possess a limited amount of marijuana in their [sic] home for personal use"
(citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975)).
45
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987).
46

Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994); Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000).

47

48

49

See, e.g., State v ~ Lester, 649 P .2d 346, 353 (Haw. 1982).
See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren; 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997).
See, e.g., Hill, 865 P.2d 633.
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that protects "[a] private affairs interest[,] an object or a matter personal to an
50
individual such that any intrusion on it would offend a reasonable person.''
Similarly, another court prefers to keep its constitutional definition of "privacy"
51
flexible and relevant to the circumstances of each case, while a sister court
asserts that its state's constitutional provision establishes a zone of privacy
52
~'broadly and without restrictions."
One court extended privacy so far as to
embrace common law concepts, that the right to privacy in the constitution is
the equivalent of the right to be let alone. The court stated that the constitu...,
tional provision means to be free of public scrutiny, to be free from unreasonable intrusions into one's private affairs, and to be free from intrusion upon seclusion.53
Under any interpretation of these state constitutional privacies, the
courts usually employ a test that is similar to the one derived from Fourth
54
Amendment jurisprudence: Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy? Sev55
eral states use such a reasonable expectation starting point - Alaska, Califor57
58
59
nia,56 Aorida, Illinois, and Louisiana.
The state courts' threshold test will
protect a subjective expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize
60
as reasonable." As a result, some courts have adopted a two-step examination
for testing privacy interests. First,_the court will examine the individual's subjective expectation of privacy; second, it will examine whether or not society is

50

State v. Repton, 54 P.3d 233, 238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).

51

Hill, 865 P.2d at 651.

52

People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 298 (Ill. 2004); A.G. Edwards, Inc. v. Sec'y of State,
772 N.E.2d 362, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
53

Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 562,- 566 (La.
1997). These three_privacies are all protected under tort law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS§ 652(A) (1977).
54

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27t 33 (2001); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998);
Katz v. United States, 389 U~S. 347, 359 (1967).

•

55

Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 738 (Alaska 1990).

56

Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren; 940 P.2d 797, 811 (Cal. 1997); Bearman v. Superior
Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 2.004), review denied (June 30, 2004).
57

Commitment of Smith v. State, 827 So. 2d 1026, 1030 (Fla. CLApp. 2002).

58

People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 300 (Ill. 2004); A.G. Edwards, Inc. v. Sec'y of State,
772 N.E.2d 362, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
59

Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 562, 566 (La.
1997); E. Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Crossen; 892 So. 2d 666, 669 (La. Ct.
App. 2004), writ denied 897 So. 2d 608 (La. 2005).

60

Jennings, 788 P.2d at 738 (internal quotation omitted); see also Capital City Press v. E.

Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 562, 566 (La. 1997); State v. Hepton, 54 P.3d
233, 238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) ("A private affairs interest is an object or a matter personal to an
individual such that any intrusion on it would offend a reasonable person.").
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61

willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable. That examination ne.c essarily has some limits .
To be sure, these state constitutional rights are not necessarily absolute
62
rights, particularly as suggested by the limitations set by the reasonableness of
one's expectation of privacy. State constitutional privacy rights may be broader
than federal rights, but they might still have to give way to other interests. They
63
may have to give way to the public interest- on a case-by-case basis - or give
64
way to the rights of others. But nearly uniformly, government intrusions on
these constitutional provisions trigger strict scrutiny because of the provisions'
65
status as fundamental rights.
Therefore, such intrusion passes constitutional
66
muster only if there is a compelling state interest and the intrusion is effected
67
by the least restrictive means. Consequently, these explicit state constitutional
provisions grant broader protections to their citizens than does the Constitution

61

G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); E. Bank Consol. Special
Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Crossen, 892 So. 2d 666, 669 (La. Ct. App. 2004 ), writ denied 897 So. 2d
608 (La. 2005); Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ-., 675 P.2d 962, 967 (Mont. 1984);
State v. McKinney; 60 P.3d 46, 49 (Wash. 2002).
62

See; e.g., Jennings, 788 P.2d at 738; Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d at 298; Capital City Press, 696

So. 2d at 566.
63

See, e.g., Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); E.
Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Crossen, 892 So. 2d 666, 669 (La. Ct. App. 2004),
writ denied, 897 So. 2d 608 (La. 2005). One of those important public interests is government

transparency under state open records laws. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. D.B., 784 So. 2d
585; 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). However, the variations of disclosure under and in compliance with open records acts is beyond the scope of this Article. In any case, that raises the question of whether or not school records are public records under state law and, therefore, even come
under the jurisdiction of the open records acts. There is an argument that some student records are,
in reality, private records for which schools are only the bailee. See Stuart, Primer, supra note 19,
at 637-39.
64

State, Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. McCorkle, 694 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 1997).

65

G.P., 842 So. 2d at 1062; McCorkle, 694 So. 2d at 1081; Annstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364,
374 (Mont. 1999).

66

See, e.g., Jennings, 788 P.2d at 738; Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 811

(Cal. 1997) ("compelling interest" test applies in autonomy privacy); Commitment of Smith v.
State, 827 So. 2d 1026, 1031 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002); Bd. of County Comm'rs, 784 So. 2d at 588;
State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 378 (Haw. 1988); Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 374.
67

See, e.g., Jennings; 788 P.2d at 738 (''least intrusive"); Commitment of Smith, 827 So. 2d at
1031; McCorkle, 694 So. 2d at 1081 ("narrowly defined"); Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 374 (Mont.
1999). ("narrowly tailored"); see also Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d at 298 (constitutional provision protects from uunreasonable" invasions of privacy). To be sure, there is an occasional variation to this
commonly recognized constitutional scrutiny: in Hill v. NCAA, 865 P!'2d 633 (Cat 1994), the
California Supreme Court - in a student-athlete drug-testing case- used a "balancing test'; that
weighed the particular privacy interest against a legitimate governmental (or, here, private) interest. Id. at 655. Another California case only required "good causeH to support a subpoena for
medical records. Bearman v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 647-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004),
review denied, (June 30, 2004). However, the more consistent test used by the state courts in
testing their constitutional privacy rights is strict scrutiny.
.
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by according citizens a fundamental right to privacy, even to minors.
The
question remains about their coverage over minors' student records.
Regardless of the language, the majority of this type of state constitutional provisions protects infortnational privacy in general and, therefore, likely
69
protects student records in particular. Protections in at least three states recognize informational privacy as an overarching, general concept derived from the
constitutional provision. In California, inforttlational privacy is protected as the
interest "in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential
70
information." And "[a] particular class of infortnation is private when wellestablished social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over
71
its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity."
72
73
Likewise, Montana and Hawai'i broadly recognize infortnational privacy as
within the particular ambit of their constitutions.
The remaining states also seem to provide coverage for infortnational
privacy, but the analysis is derived in response to particular problems; they have
not yet thrown a protective blanket over information per se. Because the qurere
before these courts did not strike so generally, representative cases address on a
piecemeal basis the protection of specific types of information. Particularly
74
protected in these cases are health care information, evaluation procedures and
76
75
personnel matters concerning public employees, taped conversations, phone
68

E.g., B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1995); S.C. v. Guardian ad Litem, 845 So. 2d
953, 958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Lungren, 940 P.2d at 814; In re T.A.J., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331,
334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
69

To date, only South Carolina and Arizona seem not to have addressed informational privacy
cases under their respective constitutions. South Carolina's situation might be best attributable to
the fact that it is more akin to the Fourth Amendment search and seizure privacy issues than privacy in general. That is not to say that information privacy would not be protected by these two
states' provisions. Such apparently limiting language has not stopped other states from interpreting their own provisions to provide broader than expected information protection. See, e.g., ILL.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
70

Lungren, 940 P.2d at 812; Hill, 865 P.2d at 654.

71

Hill, 865 P.2d at 654.

72

State v. Bilant, 36 P.3d 883, 887 (Mont. 2001).

73

State v. Lester, 649 P.2d 346, 353 (Haw. 1982). Hawaii's constitutional provision also
protects the interests formulated in the common law invasion of privacy tort, such as the unauthorized disclosure of personal or embarrassing facts. /d.
74

Bilant, 36 P.3d at 887.
75
Teamsters Local 856 v. Priceless, L.L.C., 5 Cal. Rptr 3d 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), review
denied (Jan. 22, 2004) (detailed salary infonnation); E. Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist.
v. Crossen, 892 So. 2d 666, 670 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (discovery request for assistant fire chiefs
complete personnel file denied because such files come within the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy); Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294, 300 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (constitution prohibits public access to evaluation reports of city's department directors because they are confidential,
disclosure may inhibit candid and objective evaluations, and disclosure may embarrass or humiliate the employee); Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 675 P.2d 962, 973 (Mont. 1984)
(constitution protects job performance evaluations of state university presidents for which interviewee had been promised anonymity and confidentiality).
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77
78
79
records, private records, personal banking records, confidential therapy
80
81
records, disclosure of sexual activity on adoption petitions, and medical records.82 Other protections include limits on the disclosure of public employee
records during discovery, such as financial infortnation and family names and
83
addresses. In California, in protecting the identities of an attorney's clients,
the court of appeals protected infortnation, such as financial affairs, political
84
Another California deciaffiliates, medical history, and sexual relationships.
sion protected juvenile court reports on suspected sexual abuse of minors, including psychological examinations, social services reports, and hospital re86
ports.85 Not all infortnation is afforded such privacy protection, but the trend
among the states favors doing so. Given this overarching protection for a wide
range of information, the imagination is little stretched to include student records within the analogous coverage of these decisions.
Presently, there seems to be only one published case that deals with the
constitutional protection of student records. In Porten v. University of San
Francisco, a college student sued the University of San Francisco ("USF') for
disclosing grades he earned at Columbia University to the State Scholarship and
87
Loan Commission.
Upon his transfer to USF, he had been assured that his
grades from Columbia would be kept confidential and not disclosed to third
parties without his consent. Instead, the USF sent his Columbia transcript to the

76

Lester, 649 P.2d at 353.

77

State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 49 (Wash. 2002); but see People v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d
1277, 1282-83 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (telephone records are private but are accessible by grand jury
subpoena).
78

People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 300 (Ill. 2004).

79

A. G. Edwards, Inc. v. Sec'y of State, 772 N.E.2d 362, 369, 371 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).

80

S.C. v. Guardian ad Litem, 845 So. 2d 953, 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).

81

G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1061, I 063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); but see Borges v. City
of W. Palm Beach, 858 F.Supp. 174 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (constitution did not protect arrest record for
solicitation of prostitution even though found not guilty because it was a public record).
82

Bearman v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).

83

Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 739 (Alaska 1990).

84

Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 347-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).

85

In re Tiffany G., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8, 9-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).

86

Public employee drug-testing may not be protected information under state constitutional
privacy. McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dept., 799 P.2d 953, 956-57 (Haw. 1990); see also Hill v.
NCAA, 865 P .2d 633, 635 (Cal. 1994). In Louisiana, applications for public employment are
accessible to the press. Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d
562, 566-67 (La. 1997) (job applications and resumes for position at metropolitan airport authority
are not confidential once they have been submitted). Driver's license records are not historically
protected in Washington. State v. MciGnney, 60 P.3d 46, 49 (Wash. 2002). And there is no privacy right in a notice provided to school by a minor under the tort claims act. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Super. Ct., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
87

Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
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88

Commission, even though it was neither needed nor requested.
As this was
one of the earliest cases testing the limits of the newly ratified California constitutional privacy provision, the court of appeals enumerated the four primary
"mischiefs" the new provision prohibited: 1) government snooping and gathering personal inforntation in secret; 2) overbroad business and governmental
collection and retention of unnecessary personal information; 3) improper use of
personal infonnation collected for another specific purpose, including imRroper
9
disclosure to third parties; and 4) unchecked inaccuracies of information. The
court then determined that Parten's complaint focused on the third mischief,
90
"improper use of infonnation properly obtained for a specific purpose." The
. court ruled Parten had stated a prima facie violation of California's constitu91
tional provision.
Therefore, explicit state constitutional privacy provisions likely protect
student records from disclosure to a greater extent than federal law.

B.

Implicit Constitutional Privacy Rights

Reaching similar results are those state courts that have divined implicit
privacy rights in their constitutions. The rise of these newly discovered privacy
rights is in no small measure due to hot-button issues in federal litigation, such
as abortion-regulation statutes, restrictions on medical decision-making, and
criminalization of homosexual conduct. Plaintiffs are taking advantage of state
constitutional litigation in these areas because they are more likely to successfully protect their autonomy privacy that federal courts are becoming increas92
ingly reluctant to grant under the Constitution. States with such implicit pri94
95
96
93
vacy rights currently include Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
99
100
97
98
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.
•

•

88
89

/d.
Id. at 842 (citing White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975)).

90

/d.
91
Id. at 843-44. The court narrowed its analysis to reach this result after consulting additional
statutory authority in the California Education Code and the newly enacted FERP A. The Porten
court then suggested that the University would have to provide a compelling public interest for the
unauthorized transmission of the Columbia transcript in order to overcome the plaintiffs prima
facie case. /d. Note that later California cases have elided by this strict scrutiny standard. See
supra note 62.
92

See generally Gormley & Hartman, supra note 4, at 1287-89. The Gonnley & Hartman
article is a nice compendium of state constitutional privacy cases through 1992.

93

Indiana recently flirted with the notion that it protects a fundamental right of privacy in
Indiana Constitution art. I, § l. Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 814 N.E.2d 1042, 1049 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004), vacated 837 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. 2005). The Indiana Supreme Court determined that,
even if Indiana's constitution protects a woman's fundamental right to tenninate her pregnancy,
the challenged uwaiting-period" statute was not a "material burden" on that right. ld. at 988.

94

KY. CONST. §§ 1, 2:
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§ 1: All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned:
First:

The right of enjoying and defending
their
lives
and
liberties
.
•

****
Third: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.

****
§ 2: Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere-in a republic, not even in the largest majority.

See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,492-95 (Ky. 1992).
95

MINN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 2, 10:

§ 1: Government is instituted for the security, benefit and protection of the
people, in whom all political power is inherent, together with the right to alter,
modify or refonn government whenever required by the public good.
§ 2: No member of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of
the rights or privileges -s ecured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the
land or the judgment of his peers. . . .

****
§ 10: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant -s hall issue but upon probable cause ....

See Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N. W.2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988).
96

N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 2 & 3:

Art. 2: All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights - among
which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing,
and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness. -·
••

Art. 3: When men enter into a state of society, they surrender up some of their
natural rights to that society, in order to ensure the protection ofothers; and,
without such an equivalent, the surrender is void.

See In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 95 (N.H. 1984).
97

N.J .. CaNST. art. 1, CJ[ 1: "AU persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain
natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing, and protecting_property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."

See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (N.J. 1981); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J.
1976).
98

art. 1, § 1: "All men are born equally fre.e and independent, and have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness."
PA. CaNST.

See In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77
99

(Pa~

1980).

art. I, §§ 3, 7, 8, 19, 27 (Declaration of Rights). Tennessee's broad sanction
of privacy seems to arise from the penumbras of its bill of rights, most particularly (but not exclusively) shaped by Tennessee Constitution art. I, § 8; "[N]o man shall be taken or imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed
or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his--peers or the law of the land:"
See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
TENN. CONST.
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The source of most of these implicit privacy rig_hts is primarily the respective state's bill of rights. More specifically, the source of constitutional
privacy is inherent in the inalienable rights of t~e state citizens in Kentucky,
New Hampshire, New Jersey; and Pennsylvania. For example, New Jersey's
Constitution provides: ''All persons are by nature free and independent, and
have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,
101
Similarly worded is
and of purs:uing and obtaining safety and happiness_."
~'All
men
have
New Hampshire's
constitutional
provision
that
protects
privacy:
.
certain natural, essential, and inherent rights - among which are, the enjoying
and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property;
102
and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.''
·
·
The right to privacy is ,a lso found in state constitutional due process
provisions, such as in the Minnesota and. Tennessee Constitutions: "No member
of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judg.103
ment of his peers ...."
Or "no-man shall be ... deprived of his life, liberty
104
or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.''
Texas's
constitutional right to privacy is even more ephemeral, apparently emanating
105
from the penumbras of the document itself, the penumbras of being Texan.
Regardless of the sources, these constitutional provisions protect a privacy of similar dimensions and with similar scrutiny as their sister jurisdictions
with explicit privacy provisions. However, with the inherent vagueness of any
implication, the state court decisions in these jurisdictions- tend to be a little
vaguer in their recognition of a state constitutional right to privacy, in contrast
106
to the explicit privacy rights. For instance, Texas recognizes zones of privacy while Pennsylvania has a broad privacy right that includes the right to be let
108
107
Tennessee's
alone and the right to prevent disclosure of personal matters.
.

.

100

The cases dealing with Texas's right of privacy never specify a particular provision in the
state constitution from which the right arises. Presumably, it is a "penumbral" right, arising from
the nature of the document itself~ See, e.g., Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental
Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987); see also TEx. CONST~ art. 1, § 9.
101

N.J. CONST. art. 1, <JI l.

102

N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2.

103

IU4

MINN. CONST.

art. 1, § 2.

TENN. CONST.

art. I, § 8.

105

"'We do not doubt ... that a right of individual privacy is implicit among those 'general,
great, and essential principles of liberty and free government' established by the Texas Bill of
Rights.n Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746
S.W.2d 203,205 (Tex. 1987); Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276,285 (Tex. App. 1995).
106

Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. App. 1995) (citing Tex. State Employees
Union, 746 S.W.2d at 203).
Commonwealth v. Nixon~ 761 A.2d 1151, 1156 (Pa. 2000) (citing Stenger v. Lehigh Valley
Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992)).
101

108

In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980).
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109

constitutional right to privacy is interpreted as "the right to be let alone."
These categories are somewhat fuzzier than those elucidated when the privacy
right is explicit.
In any event, these decisions too assert that these state constitutional
provisions recognize broader privacy interests than the United State Constitu110
Although they acknowledge this constitutional right to privacy is not
tion.
112
111
absolute, they agree it is fundamental. Just as with explicit constitutional
provisions, the implicit provision of privacy must be protected from unreasonable intrusion, and any such intrusion is subject to strict scrutiny and a compel113
114
ling state interest or, at the very least, a countervailing public interest.
These implicit constitutional provisions also recognize and usually prot~ct infor?Iational privacy w~en s~ch privacy is at issue. Thel protect info~
15
11
117
tional pnvacy, generally, tn Mtnnesota,l New Jersey,
Pennsylvania,
118
119
Texas
and perhaps Tennessee;.
One court has designated the right as such
''freedom from disclos.ure of certain matters which an individual deems so personal that publication adversely affects one's right to the pursuit of life, liberty,
120
State courts have variously afforded this protection to mediand happiness."
.

.

109

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d
250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
11

°

Commonwealth
v.
Wasson,
842
S.W.2d
487,
491,
497
(Ky.
1992);
State
v.
Davidson,
481
.
.
N.W.2d 51,58 (Minn. 1992); Campbell, 926- S.W.2d at 261.
111

Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 356 A.2d 35, 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), affd, 383 A.2d 428
(N.J. 1978); Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1156; Fischer v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 543
A.2d 177, 179 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
112

See, e.g., State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, Ill (Minn. 1987).
113
See, e.g., State v. Mellett, 642 N.W.2d 779, 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); In re Caulk, 480
A.2d 93, 95 (N.H. 1984); Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1156; Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 262; Tex. State
Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205
(Tex. 1987); Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. App. 1995).
114

Lehrhaupt; 356 A.2d at 41; Fischer, 543 A.2d at 179.

115

Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., Special Sch. Dist. No.
1, 512 N.W.2d 107, Ill (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).

116

Lehrhaupt, 383 A.2d at 428.

117

In re June. 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980).
Fox v~ Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. App. 1993).

118
119

Both federal and state courts have determined that the Tennessee Constitution does not
protect the privacy of information. Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 480-82 (6th Cir. 1999);
Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. 1999). The reasoning of the former is barely sup~
ported by law and is not binding on a state. court while the reasoning of the latter is somewhat
suspect because its underlying and confusing rationale is based on precedent that has nothing to
do with Tennessee's constitutional right to privacy.

°

12

Fischer v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 543 A.2d 177, 179 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988) (citing In re June 1979,415 A.2d 73).
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122

123

cal reports, financial records, employment .records, lists of group mem124
125
bers, identities of victims of sexual assault,
polygraph testing by a state
126
agency, and court records that would reveal a minor's identity and settlement
127
of his tort claim from a sexual assault by an AIDs-infected counselor.
However, the basis for the authority to use implicit constitutional privacy provisions to protect informational privacy is not nearly as overwhelming
as authority under explicit privacy provisions. Based on the extant published
cases, fewer litigants have used implicit constitutional protections to challenge
government intrusions into citizens' privacy. That is not to say that other jurisdictions w~ll not recognize informational privacy when the issue aris.es. If one
examines the vintage of these cases, one notes that they are only ten to fifteen
years old. Fewer implicit privacy provisions have been recognized because,
apparently, fewer implicit privacy provisions have been tested in court But
with the increased interest in plaintiffs' resorting to state constitutional protections,-the trend to imply privacy rights in th-o se constitutions cannot be. ignored
by school districts.
Both explicit and implicit privacy provisions in state constitutions offer
a safe haven to student records that might not be present in the United States
Constitution. Indeed, student records are those documents in which citizens
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. As a fundamental right, these state
constitutional privacy rights would take preceden.c e over any conflicting federal
or state statutes that purport to allow disclosure without a compelling state interest. A compelling state interest would obviously embrace legitimate educational
128
interests in the records,
but other non-educational interests should have an
uphill battle arguing for disclosure of this infom1ation in these states. Although
not necessarily an exemplar of student records privacy, Porten comes closest to
nailing the real privacy issue~ H schools collect personal information from
schoolchildren for a legitimate educational purpose, then by what right may
121

.

In re June 1979, 415 A.2d at 75..;78 (court authorized limited disclosure of medical reports

on tissue specimens pursuant to subpoena only because of grand jury secrecy rules but promised
confidentiality for purposes of further litigation); Fox, 869 S.W.2d at 504.
Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 356 A.2d 35, 41-42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div~ 1976) aff'd, 383 A.2d
428 (N.J. 1978) (holding that financial infonnation is protected by constitution but government
transparency requires municipal officials to file annual reports of assets and liabilities); Fox, 869
S.W.2d at 507; see also Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs.,
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (teacher disciplinary
records ate not protected from government transparency).
122

123
124
125
126

Fox, 869 S. W.2d at 504.
/d.
/d.

Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation., 746
S.W.2d 203, 205-06 (Tex. 1987).
127
Fox, 869 S.W.2d at 507.
128
E.g., 20 U.S.C. § l232g(b)(I) (2000).
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schools disclose that infom1ation in the absence of a parallel legitimate educa129
tional purpose?
School administrators in the affected states must be aware of the growth
in state constitutional litigation and give due consideration to whether compliance with disclosure requests - even under FERPA or state open records acts is a wise idea in light of the fundamental protections offered to infortnational
privacy under their state constitutions. htdeed, school districts in all other states
must be aware of the movement to rely on state constitutions as the source of
privacy rights and be prepared to defend privacy policies that do not stand up to
the strict scrutiny of "need to know."
IV. PRIVACY STATUTES & REGULATIONS PROTECTING STUDENT RECORDS
A more prevalent type of privacy protection afforded by states is
through legislation; many state statutes provide privacy to student records.
Some state statutes make student records private information as a matter of law.
Such statutes include those that are derived from FERPA and those that simply
afford specific privacy protection to these student records. ·Similarly, state education departments have promulgated regulations that offer privacy protections,
130
The "advantage" of these statutes
especially for special education records.
over federal statutes is that private enforcement is likely available, in contrast to
the limitations placed on FERPA by Gonzaga University v. Doe.

A.

Mini-FERPAs~·

Statutes&. Regulations

The majority of states that have developed student record privacy regimes have done so by engrafting the principles of FERPA into their own local
statutes. FERPA is the federal statute that hinges federal funding upon compliance with a statutory framework that denotes what student records may be dis131
Its coverage is comprehensive and detailed in establishclosed and to whom.
ing what is an education record subject to protection and what is not, how edu132
Although FERPA does not
cation records can be disclosed and to whom.
129

Such limitation on disclosures may even significantly limit the reach non-educational disclosures currently allowed under FERPA. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l}(D) (student aid); 20
U.S.C. § 1232g (b)(l)(E) (juvenile justice authorities); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (b)(l)(J) (grand jury
subpoenas). See generally, Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17.
.

.

130

It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the specific protections for all student
information, such as screening tests, individual surveys, etc. The focus here is on privacy protections that cast their net broadly over student information in education records.
131
132

20U.S.C. § 1232g.

/d.; see generally Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17; Lynn M. Daggett & Dixie Snow
Huefner, Recognizing Schools' Legitimate Educational Interests: Rethinking FERPA's Approach
to the Confidentiality of Student Discipline and Classroom Records, 51 AM. U . L. REv. 1 (2001);
Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley 1: Making the Federal Student Records Statute Work, 46
CATH. U. L. REv. 617 (1996-97).
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protect students' "directory information" -- name, home address, telephone
133
number, age, and the like
-- it does protect ''e,d ucation re,c ords," which are
"records, files, documents, and other materials which . . . contain information
directly related to a student; and ... are maintained by an educational agency or
134
institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution."
FERPA then
prescribes four primary areas of responsibilities for school districts vis vis
135
those records~
Those basic areas are providing parental access to student education records; supplying notice of that access to parents; regulating the disclosure of education records, particularly nonconsensual disclosure; and regulating
136
the collection of information in student records.
Education records may be
disclosed and/or accessed by certain third parties, but for the most part, those
137
disclosure and access provisions are rather narrow.
Perhaps becaus_e of
FERPA's familiarity, a large number of state legislatures have adapted its principles, in some shape or form, to govern privacy in their respective states' public
138
schools.
One method of incorporating FERPA into a state privacy regime is to
139
simply incorporate it by reference to its name and citation.
For instance,
Utah's relevant statute states:

a

Employe.e s and agents of the state's public education system
shall protect the privacy of students, their parents, and their
families . . . through compliance with the protections provided
for family and student privacy under . . . the Federal Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act and related provisions under 20 U.S.C,. 1232(g) and (h) in the administration and operation of all public school programs, regardless of the source of
140
funding.

133

20 U~S.C~ § 1232g(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31 (2005).

134

20 UwS.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
ld. § 1232g.
/d.; see also- Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17.
20 u.s.c. § 1232g.
See generally Richard A. Leiter, ed., NATIONAL

135
136

137
l38

SURVEY OF STATE LAWS

269-74 (5th ed.

2005).
139

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 15-141 & 15-1043 (2002); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 20-A § 5001-A
(West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 15.243(2) (2001 & Supp. 2005) (incorporated in open records
act as exemption); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-15-3 (2001); MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 20-1-213(1) (2003);
NEV. REV. ST~ §§ 3.8 6.650 & 386.655 (2003); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN., § 189:1-e (1999); UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 53A-13-301(1) (2000); WASH. REv. CODE§ 28A.605.030 (Supp. 2005). Colorado,
curiously enough, has incorporated FERPA into its open records act, thereby regulating disclosure~ not privacy. Cow. REv. STAT.§ 24-72-204(3) (2004).
140
UTAHCODEANN. § 53A-l3-301 (2000).
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Nevada's statute simply provides that "the public schools ... shall comply with
the provisions of ... the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C.
141
§ 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto ; .. ~"
Similarly pro142
143
saic are Arizona's and Maine's wholesale incorporation of FERPA into
·
their statutory scheme.
That is not to say that state statutes have incorporated FERPA carte
blanche without some adaptation. Some legislatures have incorporated it for
reference only and have still created th-e ir own disclosure and access regimes.
For example, Michigan has incorporated FERPA's disclosure exemptions generally then further exempted (at the discretion of the school district) even directory information from disclosure for purposes of marketing, surveys and solici144
Mississippi has only incorporated FERPA's parental access provitation.
145
sion whereas Washington has adopted only FERPA's nonconsensual disclo146
sure provisions.
New Hampshire only incorporates FERPA's directory infonnation provision: "A local education ,agency which maintains education
records may provide information designated as directory infortnation consistent
147
Montana
with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)."
limits FERPA's provisions only to matters of disclosure to the juvenile justice
148
system while Oregon includes that and the provisions for disclosure to law

•

141

NEV. REv. ST. § 386.655( 1)(a).

142

ARIZ~

143
144

145

REv. STAT.§§ 15-141A & 15-1043 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 5001-A.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.243(2).
MISS. CODE ANN.§ 37-15-3 (2001).

146

WASH. REv. CODE § 28A.605.030 (Supp. 2005). The Washington statute is rather hard to
follow insofar as it suggests that student records may be disclosed without consent in accordance
with FERPA. However, local school districts are instructed to establish procedures prohibiting
the release of student records without parental consent.
147

N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 189:1-e (1999).

148

MONT. CODE ANN.§ 20-1-213(5) (2003); see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 6001(3)

(Supp. 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 180.1135(5) (2001) (FERPA. limits disclosure to law enforcement agencies). Washington incorporates FERPA in only a couple of instances, one of
which is cooperation with the juvenile justice system. WASH. REv~ CODE § 11.40.480 (2004). As
a point of reference, FERPA has carved out a specific, limited exception concerning the disclosure
of student records when disclosed to juvenile justice authorities; disclosure is appropriate pursuant
to specific state statutes governing the same. 20 U .S.C. § 1232(b)( 1)(E) (2000). These statutes
are also supposed to assure these records will not be further disclosed without written consent of
the parent(s). See generally Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17. Hence, states are likely to emphasize special disclosure rules for the juvenile justice system, as in Arizona, ARIZ. REv~ STAT. § 151410 (2002 & Supp. 2005); Florida, FLA. STAT. § l002.22(3)(d)(l3) (2004 & Supp. 2005); Illinois, 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/6(a)(6.5) (1998 & Supp. 2005); Indiana, IND. CODE§§ 20-33-7-1 to
-3 (2004); Iowa, IOWA CODE ·§ 280.25 {Supp. 2005); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 6001
(Supp. 2004); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT.§ 336.187(l)(b) (2003); and WASH. REV. CODE§ 13.40.480
(2004). A state that does not have such special provisions violates FERP A when its local school
districts hand over student records to the juvenile justice system.
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enforcement agencies when necessary for the health and safety of the student
149
and others.
.
On the other hand, some states have actually mimicked FERPA by
drafting their own mini-FERPAs that govern access to and disclosure of student
150
records.
Some of these state "mini-FERPAs'' are complex and intricate, such
.as California's, which is more comprehensive than FERPA itself. California's
pupil records protection includes specific statutory pro.v isions for parental notice
151
of access to student records, maintenance of logs noting persons requesting
3
152
and receiving access to student records, release of directory information! 5
154
and regulation of access to and disclosure of records to third parties.
Equally
inclusive is Florida's mini-FERPA, the purpose of which is to
protect the rights of students and their parents with respect to
student records and reports as created, maintained, and used by
public educational institutions of the state. The intent of the
Legislature is that students and their parents shall have rights of
access, rights of challenge, and rights of privacy with respect to
such records and reports, and that rules shall be available for the
155
exercise of these rights.
156

Similarly comprehensive are the lllinois School Student Records Act,
the
157
Kentucky Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, the Colorado statute for
159
158
the protection of student data, and the Wisconsin pupil records act, all of
which provide for parental notice and access and limited disclosure to certain
third parties.
149

°

OR. REv. STAT.§ 336.187(1)(a).

15

CAL.

151

CAL.. Eouc. CODE

152

ld. § 49064.
Id. § 49073.
ld. §§ 49075-77.

Eouc. CODE§§ 49060-49079 (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4111 (1999 &
Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. § 1002.22 (2004 & Supp. 2005); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 to 10/10.
(1998 & Supp. 2005); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 160.710 (West 1999); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
3319.321 (LexisNexis 2004); VA. CODE ANN.§ 22.1-287 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT.
§ 118.125 (2004).

153
154

§ 49063.

155

FLA. STAT.§ 1002.22(1).

156

1051LL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 to 10/10 (1998 & Supp. 2005).

157

KY:REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 160.700-.730 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004). Kentucky presumes
student records are confidential. /d. § 160.705( 1).
158

COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-123 (2004). Colorado's statute is a blend of its own FERPA-Iike

organization while periodically incorporating federal
159

~tatutory

citations, such as FERPA's.

118.125 (2004). Wisconsin's statute, like Kentucky's, starts with the premise
that pupil records are confidential then lists numerous exceptions to that confidentiality. WIS.
STAT. § 118.125(2).
WIS. STAT.§

•
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Some state statutes pattern themselves after FERPA but provide more
presumptive privacy rights. For example, the Florida student privacy statute is
the most rigorous in the country although it is similar to FERPA in many respects in its regulation of parental access, parental notice, and nonconsensual
disclosures. Florida's legislative purpose is that
.

.

[e]very student has a right of privacy with respect to the educational records kept on him or her.. Personally identifiable records or reports of a student, and any personal information contained therein, are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1)
[open records act]. A state .or local educational agency, board,
public school, career center, or public postsecondary educational institution may not permit the release of such records, reports, or information without the written consent of the student's
parent, or of the student himself or herself if he or she is qualified as provided in this subsection, to any individual, agency, or
160
organization.
Similarly, Delaware's mini-FERPA denotes all student "personal" records as
confidential and, unlike FERPA, restricts non-school disclosure only to parents
and to government agencies for "public health, safety,-law enforcement or na161
tional security" when pursuant to "law or court order."
The major exemption
in the Delaware statute allows only for consensual disclosure of school records
162
to potential employers and institutions of higher education.
In sum, states
have ,e ngrafted privacy onto FERPA where such privacy does not otherwise
exist.
FERPA has been instrumental in guiding state legislatures in enacting
their own versions of education records privacy protections. Similarly, it has
been instrumental in guiding state education departments in drafting privacy
regulations.
Rather than enact FERPA-like statutes, other states have formulated
FERPA-like regulations. Although a complete rundown of all the regulations
adopted by any particular state board of education is beyond the scope of this
Article, school districts must be aware that such regulations exist as they too are
enforceable in protecting student record privacy. School districts must be aware
that these regulations might be fairly strict, such as in Massachusetts, where
state regulations provide that no third party shall have ,a ccess to information in
or from student records without specific, informed written consent of the eligi163
ble student or parents .
West Virginia has likewise been influenced by FERPA
•

160

FLA. STAT.§ 1022.22(3)(d) (Supp. 2005).

161

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 41ll(a)(l) (1999).

162

ld. § 4111 (a)(2).

Commonwealth v. Buccella~ 751 N.E.2d 373, 380 (Mass. 2001); Commonwealth v. Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d '883, 888 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). In Nathaniel N., the court relied on 603
163
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164

in one of its state education rules.
In coordination with its statutory right to
privacy, Pennsylvania's Department of Education regulations require that local
school districts adopt FERPA-type rules concerning disclosure of and access to
165
And New Jersey has a regulatory scheme that mirrors
student records.
FERPA yet places on the local districts a great deal of responsibility for formu166
Even by regulatory regime, FERPA has influenced
lating their own policies.
privacy policy at the state level.
Many state legislatures have taken up the banner of student privacy and
have done so by mimicking the intent and format of the federal FERPA to protect student records. In their various forms, these statutes and regulations pose
challenges to school districts who may be more inclined to follow FERPA rather
than more restrictive state statutes. Insofar as these state statutes are not expressly preempted by FERPA and a school district complies with FERPA when
complying with a more restrictive state statute, there is no obstacle to prevent a
167
This tack is especially
district's following state statutes rather than FERPA.
MASS. CODE REGS. 23.07(4) (1995}, in detennining that a school did not unlawfully fail to provide

juvenile defendant's school records to the police pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. This Massachusetts regulation is a regulatory version of FERPA and a restrictive
version it is: "no third party shall have access to infonnation in or from student records without
specific, infonned written consent of the eligible student or parents." /d.; Nathaniel N., 764
N.E.2d at 888. Indeed, the court gave greater force and effect to this state regulation than to
IDEA's suggestion that special education records are to be sent to law enforcement authorities
when special education students are involved.
164

W.Va. Code. R. §§ 126-94-1 to 30 (2003). This State Board of Education Procedural Rule
limit[s] collection and disclosure of infonnation relating to students which is
individually identifiable, generally requiring consent of the parents for disclosure and collection, except when collection is a normal part of the educational
program. Disclosure requires consent of the parents, except when for release
of directory information or in specific circumstances. Students and parents
have the right to review such information, and procedures are established to
amend the records when found to be inaccurate and to challenge disclosures
which are in violation of the policy.

State ex rei. Garden State Newspapers, Inc. v. Hoke, 520 S.E.2d 186, 194-95 (W. Va. 1999) (holding court did not exceed its power in sealing record of proceedings brought by juvenile against
school district and its administrators because that record included educational records).
165

22 PA. CODE§§ 12.31-.33 (2004); Bd. of Dirs. of Palmyra Area Sch. Dist. v. Palmyra Area
Educ. Ass'n, 644 A.2d 267,270 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (teachers' union improperly used mailing
list compiled of student names and addresses because not accessed for "legitimate educational
interest"); Parents Against Abuse in Schs. v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 594 A.2d 796, 802-03
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (parents had right of access to school psychologist's notes from interviews he conducted of students who had suffered physical and mental abuse by a teacher). "The

governing board of every school district, intermediate unit and area vocational-technical
school shall adopt a plan for the collection, maintenance and dissemination of pupil
records and submit the same to the Department for approval." 22 PA. CODE§ 12.31(a).
166

N.J. ADMIN. CODE§ 6:3-6.1 (2004).

167

See supra note 13 and accompanying text; U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Supremacy Clause);

Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982).
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important when the litigation stakes are higher under state law than under federal law.

B.

Access Only Statutes

168
Several states only regulate access to student records.
Unlike the
FERPA-type legislation and regulations, these legislatures apparently presumed
the confidentiality of education records but felt compelled to legislate exemptions to that implicit privacy by affirmatively allowing access.
These statutes are reminiscent of FERPA but only address access to studentrecords and are in a small number of jurisdictions. Ohio's student records
access statute looks like FERPA 'b ut it does not have the same content. Rather,
169
Also rather
it is an amalgam of limitations on access to student records.
170
171
FERPA-like are Virginia's and Nebraska's student records statutes. Instead
of governing student privacy, they govern access to those records.
More straightforward in their focus_on access to student records are the
statutes in Connecticut, Georgia~ Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and
172
173
Texas. For example, Texas and Connectic_u t merely establish a parent's
right to access his or her child's education records. Similarly limited is Georgia's treatment of student records: "No local school system . . . shall have a
policy of denying . . . parents . . . the right to inspect and review the education
174
The Rhode Island statute is limited to the rights of
records of their child ."
175
parents, legal guardians, and eligible students.
Massachusetts's statutes mandate that the state board of education create regulations for the "maintenance,
176
retention, duplication, storage and periodic destruction" of student records, ·
and also provides for specific access to parents, guardians and students over the
177
age of eighteen.
And New Jersey.' s statute similarly mandates the state board
of education to supply regulations that, among other things, will govern access.178
.
.

168

See generally Leiter, supra note 138.

169

OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §

170
171

VA. CODE ANN.§

3319.321 (2004).

22.1-287 (2001).

NEB. REV. STAT., § 79-2,104 (2003).;

172

TEx. Eouc. CoDE ANN.§ 26.004 (Vernon 1996).. These parental rights also seem to extend
to what might otherwise be covered by privilege, like counseling and psychological records.
173
174

175
176

CONN~ GEN. STAT.§ 10-15b (2002).
GA. CODE ANN.

§ 20-2~720 (2005).

R.I. GEN. LAWS §16-71-3 (2001).

ch. 71, § 340 (2002)._ The Massachusetts_Board of Education has, indeed, implemented rigorous regulations pursuant to this statute. See supra note 163.
117
/d. § 34E.
178
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 18A:36-19 (West 1999).
MASS. GEN. LAWS
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What one takes from these access statutes is the feeling that the states
presume privacy of these records and will open them only to limited disclosure.
It is unclear if the express provision of access to some means the implicit denial
of access to others. If so, then these states actually will recognize an enforceable right to privacy. However, logic suggests that the very limits of the access
to student records to parents and/or students as set out in some of the statutes
179
might, perforce, limit access by all others.

C.

Special Education Records

Special education records in all states have privacy coverage under the
regulations that must be adopted under the Individuals with Disabilities Act
180
("IDEA").
Just as some states have adopted miniature versions of FERPA to
protect the privacy of education records, so to have all states adopted similar
181
versions of the Department of Education's regulations for special education..
The IDEA requires that the states conform to its statutory mandates and adopt
regulations similar to those formulated by the Department of Education in ex182
change for partial federal funding of education for children with disabilities.
Among those state-crafted regulations must be provisions protecting the school
183
records of qualifying students under the Act.
As a consequence, under any
state regime for the protection of student records, special education records are
universally and unequivocally protected private inforn1ation by state regulation
rather than by statute. Generally, such regulations must provide for notice and
184
access to parents concerning these records.
Two notably distinct protections
cover special education students' files under these regulations: nonconsensual
disclosures of student information may only be for compliance with and provi185
sion of services under IDEA; and school districts must have an individual
186
designated to maintain the confidentiality of these files.
Thus, as mandated
by IDEA, states afford greater privacy rights to special education students than
to general education students.
179

"Expressio unius est exclusion alterius." This rule of statutory construction stands for the
principle that when a legislative body expressly enumerates items in a statute, then others not so
enumerated are presumed excluded. See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 29 (2001).
180

20 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000); 34 C.P.R. § 300.127 (2004).

181

20 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see generally Peter Walker & Sara Jane Steinberg, Confidentiality of
Educational Records: Serious Risks for Parents and School Districts, 26 J.L. & Eouc. 11 (1997).
182

20 U.S.C. § 1407.

183

''The State must have on file in detail the policies and procedures that the State has undertaken to ensure protection of the confidentiality of any personally identifiable inforrrtation, collected, used, or maintained ...." 34 C.F.R. § 300.127 (2004).
184

34 C.P.R. §§ 300.560-300.577.

185

See 34 C.F.R. §300.572(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.500(b)(3); 34 C.P.R. § 300.571.

186

34 C.F.R. § 300.572(b); Buckley/, supra note 132, at 646; see also Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17.
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At least three states, Alaska, New York, and Nevada, have also enacted
specific state statutes that regulate access to and disclosure of special education
student records. Alaska's statute places access and disclosure matters up to the
187
parents.
New York requires that the state department of education write regu188
lations governing privacy of special education records.
A bit more generally,
Nevada has incorporated the IDEA and its regulations into its automated infor189
mation system.
Other than those three states, the rest seem to be resting on
the protections provided by their regulations patterned on those drafted by the
Department of Education to cover their special education records under the
IDEA.
D.

Reaping the Whirlwind: Enforcing Statutory Rights

The affirmative enforceability of these state statutes and regulations is
what will make them more valuable and clearly more powerful than FERPA.
After Gonzaga University v. Doe, FERPA has virtually no life left for vindicating individual privacy rights. Thus, state statutes could become the new "club"
for requiring school districts to honor the privacy of student records. Congress's
power to govern the states through its spending powers (or its conm1erce powers) does not have similar parallels with the power that state legislatures have to
190
regulate state citizens.
State courts are more likely to interpret their privacy
statutes to include personal rights than to be diluted as mere funding statutes.
Consequently, enforcing personal privacy rights pursuant to state statutes
through a private right of action may be significantly easier under state than
under federal statutes, at least so long as the legislature intended to create some
191
right to be vindicated by litigation.
•

187

STAT. § 14.30.272(a)(8) (2004): "A school district shall infonn the parent of a
child with a disability of the right ... to give consent or deny access to others to the child's educational record." Perhaps this statute would not be so broadly interpreted, but the plain meaning of
the statute indicates that there is no place for nonconsensual disclosure of these records, even to
educational personnel.
188

ALASKA

The charge to the state department is
[t]o make provision by regulation of the commissioner to assure the confidentiality of any personally identifiable data, inforntation, and records collected
or maintained ·by the state department of education or any school district, including a committee or subcommittee on special education, and the officers,
employees or members thereof, pursuant to or in furtherance of the purposes
of this article, and shall establish procedures upon which any such personally
identifiable data, information, or records may be disclosed.

N.Y. Educ. Law § 4403(9) (McKinney 2001 ).
189

NEV. REv. STAT. 386.655(2) (2003).

The statute also incorporates "any other applicable

federal Ia w."
190
191

See generally Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002).

Such intent can be detennined as follows: When " 'it appears that the duty imposed [by
statute] is ... for the benefit of particular individuals or classes of individuals, a private right of
action arises for injury sustained by reason of the breach, by any person the statute was designed
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A school district might argue that there exists no such private right of
action inuring to these statutes except in instances_where a specific right exists
192
in the statute, as in Florida, or where a specific cause of action exists, as in
193
lllinois.
However, those fine points did not even come up in the handful of
cases that school districts, students, and others have used to protect or gain access to stude_nt records. Most of such cases have been access cases in which
someone other than the statutorily designated individuals wanted access to the
194
One can conclude that these statutes' enforcement for access pur:..
records.
poses indicates the courts' willingness to vindicate individual rights under these
statutes, thereby assuring that all other privacy rights likewise would be vindicated.
Florida,- which has the strictest student privacy protections, has also had
the most reported litigation in this area. For instance, one court granted Florida
State University's motion to quash a subpoena requesting the production of
formal orders in student conduct code cases. Even though the subpoena allowed
for the redaction of identifying inforn1ation, the Florida Court of Appeals determined that these formal orders were confidential records and reports. Because Florida's privacy statutes made no provision for partial disclosure of such
records and reports, the proposed redaction would still not fulfill the legal re195
Florida's statutory restrictions were intended to prostrictions on disclosure.

to protect, provided the injury sustained by him is a special injury different from that inflicted on
the general public, and has resulted proximately from and because of the violation."' Bartholomew County Beverage Co. v. Barco Beverage Corp., 524 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
The primary considerations for examining legislative intent to create a private right of action are
the creation of a benefited class, the promotion of a legislative purpose by a private right ofaction,
and consistency with the statutory scheme. E.g., Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d
18, 20 (N.Y. 1989).- A cause of action may be implied even without the provision of an express
remedy. E.g., Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1982). See
generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 Hastings L.J. 877
(2003).
192

~'[S]tudents

and their parents shall have rights of access, rights of challenge, and rights of
privacy with respect to such records and reports .. .. .'' FLA. STAT. § 1002.22(1) (2004).
193

"Any person injured by a willful or negligent violation of this Act [Illinois School Student
Records Act] may institute an action for damages in the Circuit Court of the County in which the
violation has occurred or the Circuit Court of the County in which the school is located. 105 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 10/9(b) (1998 & S'upp. 2005); see also 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/9(a); John K. v. Bd. of
Educ. for Sch. Dist. No. 65, 504 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (parents entitled to injunctive
relief to gain access to student records).
194

Access cases might be otherwise litigated under the applicable state open records law.
However, these were actually pursued under the affirmative privacy statutes.
195

Fla. State Univ. v. Hatton! 672 So. 2d 576, 578-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (relying on
FLA. STAT. § 228.093(3)(d) now FLA. STAT. § 1002.22.) Similarly, University of Florida's honor
court proceedings are not "public meetings" because discussion therein might include confidential
student records. Marston v. Gainesville Sun PubI' g Co., 341 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976).

•
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196

vide affirrnative confidentiality to student records and not just to exempt them
from public disclosure in certain circumstances. Indeed, Florida prides itself on
197
providing greater protections than FERPA.
Other state court cases involve the partial protection of student records
by limiting access only to student information that is masked or not personally
198
Those courts generally treated student records statutes as making
identifiable.
records absolutely confidential from public disclosure unless the request was for
199
Regardless of the parties involved, school dissolely statistical inforrnation.
tricts should recognize that litigation and privately enforceable rights are inherent in these privacy statutes. Thus, these statutes bring greater risks to school
districts in tertns of inu11ediate outlays for attorney fees (and perhaps damages)
than do federal laws purporting to protect student records.
V. SUNSHINE LAWS PROTECTING STUDENT RECORDS

A.

The Protection

Often, the matter of student record privacy arises when the school district is being held accountable by a member of the public requesting information
under a state open records law. Hence, one might consider it unusual to find
protection for student records in these laws. Open records laws accommodate
the concept that govert1111ents must be accountable to their citizens and that gov200
Therefore, the
ernment agencies should be "transparent" for public oversight.
public may access many records held by the government. However, student
records are often exempted from such access.
196

See, e.g., Johnson v. Deluz, 875 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004). In Johnson v. Deluz, the
Florida Court of Appeals detennined that, even though teachers might usually be considered a
party with access to confidential student information, that right had limits. /d. Consequently, a
school board had to redact all identifying student infonnation from an investigative report concerning a principal when teachers requested a copy of that report. /d.
197

WFfV, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole, 874 So. 2d 48, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), review
denied, 892 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 2004) (TV station could not access redacted Transportation Student
Discipline Forms or surveillance videotapes).
198

See, e.g., Bowie v. Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 65, 538 N.E.2d 557, 559-60 (Ill.
1989) (Illinois Student Records Act does not protect information by which no individual student
may be identified); Human Rights Auth. of Ill. Guardianship & Advocacy Comm'n v. Miller, 464
N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Disclosure of testing and statistical information is clearly at
the forefront of so-called school reform efforts and accountability movements. Unfortunately, the
scope of this Article is not intended to travel in that territory.
199

See, e.g., Hardin County Schs. v. Foster, 40 S.W.3d 865, 868-69 (Ky. 2001) (statistical
disciplinary data that does not contain personally identifiable student infonnation is not confidential under student records act); see also Fish v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 31 S.W.3d 678, 681-83
(Tex. App. 2000) (court relied, in part, on state statute that protected student records as confidential in considering whether or not to allow disclosure of testing information identified by test
number, gender, age and ethnicity).
200

Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution,
86 MINN. L. REv. 1137, 1173 (2002).
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Each state legislature has enacted an open records statute, also called
202
"freedom of inforntation" acts, "open access" acts, and "sunshine'' laws.
What these statutes do is assure access to public information so that govern203
However, not all public records are subject to
ments do not operate in secret.
204
Instead, there
disclosure; no sunshine law mandates "absolute disclosure."
are exemptions from disclosure for those public records that the le.gislature
deems of such a nature- usually having a "privacy" interest- to which the public should not be privy. One category of information to which this exempting
method of "privacy protection" applies is student records.
Of course, this category of exemption within a sunshine law assumes
205
That is not always true. North
student records are actually public records.
Carolina has enacted a statute that specifically states that student records are
simply not public records at all: ''The official record of each student is not a
public record as the tertn 'public record' is defined by [the public records act].
The official record shall not be subject to inspection and examination as author206
Other state legislatures have implied a simiized by [the public records act].''
lar result by enacting separate privacy statutes for student records, making them
"confidential" and therefore not subject to disclosure. As discussed above, a
state with a comprehensive student records act usually considers those records
outside the purview of the open records acts. Florida's education records pri207
208
Invacy statute is such an example as is lllinois's School Records Act.
deed, student records in Florida are affirmatively confidential, not negatively

201

Kristen M. Blankley, Are Public Records too Public? Why Personally Identifying Information Should Be Removed from Both Online and Print Versions of Court Documents, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 413, 428 n.68 (2004).); Case Comment, Open Records- Agencies or Custodians Affected:
The North Dakota Supreme Court Expands the Scope of North Dakota's Open Records Law, 75
N.D. L. REv. 745, 749 n.25 (1996).
202

Solove, supra note 200, at 1160-61.

203

/d.
204
ld. at 1162.
205
In a related article, I opine that student records are not public records at all: they belong to
the students and their parents and the school is the government keeper. See generally Stuart, LexPraxis, supra note 17. These aren't records that the government must keep as a government
agency; they are records the government keeps in order to better educate. This function also
makes them distinct from employee personnel records kept by government agencies that have a
direct impact on the working of the agency. Instead, student records have virtually nothing to do
with the administration of the government function of the school, apart from statistical information required to be kept when the school is acting as a governmental agency~
206
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-402(e) (2003); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1 (2003)
(higher education student records are not "government records" in New Jersey).
207

208

FLA. STAT. § 1002.22(3)(d) (2004).

105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10 (1998 & Supp. 2005); see also Bowie v. Evanston Cmty. Consol.
Sch. Dist .. No. 65, 538 N.E.2d 557, 559-60 (Ill. 1989).
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209

exempted from disclosure.
Likewise, student records have specific confiden210
211
tiality in Wisconsin and in Kentucky.
Many state sunshine laws themselves, howe,v er, impliedly regard student records as public records but exte.n d them a modicum of privacy protection
through the traditional means of listing them as specific exemptions from public
disclosure. For instance, Colorado exempts addresses and telephone numbers of
212
public school students
and "scholastic achievement data on individual
213
persons" while one of Iowa's exemptions keeps confidential the following
public records: "[p]ersonal information in records regarding a student, prospective student, or fortner student maintained, created, collected or assembled .by
or for a school corporation or educational institution maintaining such re215

16

cords."214 Similar ~rotectio?s exist in New .Ham~shire, Okl~o~a/ Ver18
219
220
mont,217 Tennessee, Washtngton, and Wtsconstn.
Wyotrung tn a nod to
its Old West roots, exempts nearly everything under its public records act in
"[s]chool district records containing information relating to the biography, family, physiology, religion, academic achievement and physical or mental ability

209

See, e.g., WFfV, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole, 874 So. 2d 48, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. .A pp. 2004),
review denied, 892 So. 2d 10 I 5 (Fla. 2004).

210

WIS. STAT. § 118.125(2) (2004) ("All pupil records maintained by a public school shall be

confidential, except as provided [herein].''). However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has inter..
preted this provision as an exemption to the state public records act. Hathaway v~ Joint. Sch. Dist.
No. I, City of Green Bay, 342 N.W.2d 682, 687-88 (Wis. 1984).
211

"Education records of students in the public educational institutions in this state are deemed
confidential and shall· not be disclosed, or the contents released, except under the circumstances
described in [this Act].t' KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 160.705(1) (West 1999). The Kentucky Supreme
Court too views this provision as an exemption to the state's open records act rather than an affirrnati ve statement by the legislature that these are not public records. Hardin County Schs. v"'
Foster, 40 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Ky. 2001 ). That interpretation is a bit difficult to fathom given the
plain meaning of the statutory language.
212

Cow-. REv. STAT.§ 24-72-204(3)(a)(VI) (2004).

213

Cow-. REv.

STAT

§ 24-72-204(3)(a)(l); Sargent Sch. Dist. No. RE-33J v. W. Servs., Inc.,

751 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo. 1988).
214

IOWA CODE§ 22.7(1) (2001).

215

N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 91-A;4 (2001); Brent v. Paquette, 567 A.2d 976,983 (N.H. 1989).

216

OkLA STAT. tit 51, § 24A.l6 (2000). In Oklahoma; student records are kept "confidential"
along with ''teacher lesson plans, test and other teaching material" and "personal communications.
concerning individual students." /d.
217

VT. STAT. ANN.

tit. 1~ § 317 (1996).

218

TENN. CODE ANN.§ 10-7-504(a)(4) (1999).

219

WASH. REv. CODE§ 42.17.310 (2000).

220

Wisconsin's open records act exclusions have been interpreted to specifically incorporate
the pupil confidentiality statutes. WIS. STAT.§ 19.36(1) (2003); WIS. STAT.§ 118.125(2); State ex
rel. Blum v. Bd. ofEduc. Sch. Dist. of Johnson Creek, 565 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)
(ruling that interim pupil grades are pupil records exempt from disclosure in a student dispute over
GPAs and scholarship selection).
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of any student except to the person in interest or to the officials duly elected and
221
appointed to supervise him~"
Other states' exemptions are a bit more convoluted, and even repetitive
of other statutes, by carving out parts of records as being exempt or by incorporating FERPA's exemptions within their sunshine laws. As a backup to its
School Student Records Act, lllinois's freedom of information act exempts
222
"files and personal infortnation maintained with respect to ... students ...."
Maryland, on the other ·hand, includes its school records protections among the
223
specifically denominated exemptions to its public records act.
Similarly,
224
225
Michigan and Arkansas expressly incorporate FERPA as an exemption to
226
their sunshine laws. Texas exempts "in conformity with" FERPA.
Others
"protect'' student record privacy because the legislature exempts from disclosure
227
those records that are protected by federal law, like FERPA and the IDEA,
28
either specifically or generally?
Other states more broadly offer protections by generally incorporating
229
applicable_state_laws, such as Oregon, which exempts ''[s]tudent records re230
quired by state or federal law to be exempt from disclosure/'
Similarly, Vir231
ginia protects scholastic records from disclos-ure when ''prohibited by law.''
221

Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 16-4-203(d)(viii) (2005).

222

5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/?(l)(b)(i) (1988 & Supp. 2005); see also Chicago Tribune Co. v.
Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 773 N.E.2d 674~ 682 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (school board properly denied
reporter's FOIA request concerning personal information of over one million students; including
information about school, room number, medical status, special education status, race, lunch
status, grade point average, date of birth, and standardized test scores).
223

Mo. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § l0-616(k) (LexisNexis 2004); see also Kirwan v. The
Diamondback, 721 A.2d 196, 203 (Md. 1998) (stating in dictum that FERPA is federal law that
would exempt records from disclosure).

224

MICH. COMP. LAws § 15.243( 1)(t)(2) (200 1); see generally Connoisseur Communication of

Flintt L.P. v. Univ. of Mich., 584 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
225

ARK. CODE ANN.

226

TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.026 (2004).

§ 25-19-105(b)(2) (Michie 2002) (stating that the Arkansas act exempts
"education records as defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 ...
unless their disclosure is consistent with the provisions of that act ...."). See also .Ark. Gazette
Co. v. S. State Coli., 620 S.W.2d 258 (Ark. 1981).
227

But see generally Or. County R-IV Sch. Dist. v. LeMon, 739 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987). In a rather convoluted opinion, the Missouri Court of Appeals detennined that student names, addresses and telephones were not exempt from disclosure under the state's sunshine
law, even though there is an exemption "as otherwise provided by law" and FERPA did not qualify as such law prohibiting disclosure because this infonnation otherwise fit within disclosable
"d"trectory tn.ormatton
. &. .. - • .' '.)·.
228

See Tamu K._Walton; Protecting Student Privacy: Reporting Campus Crimes as an Alternative to Disclosing Student Disciplinary Records, 771ND. L.J. 143, 153 n.78 (2002).
229

/d. at 153-54 n.79.

230

OR. REV. STAT. § 192.496(4) (2003).

231

VA. CODE ANN~

§ 2.2-3705.4 (2001 ). Virginia's exemption also provides access for parents
but other access may be prohibited upon request by any parent for students under eighteen.
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New York allows public agencies to exempt records from disclosure if ex232
empted under state or federallaw.
One California court has interpreted such
general protections to cover student records even though California's Public
Records Act would have require_d disclosure of student disciplinary records be233
cause that Act also has an exemption pursuant to federal law. The court detertnined that, because FERPA included student disciplinary records as educational records under its protection, those disciplinary records were not subject to
234
disclosure.
Indiana similarly forbids public disclosure of student records be235
cause of its sunshine law's incorporation of federal law exemptions.
In summary, sunshine laws- the antithesis of privacy- provide some of the most specific protections for student records.
One odd exemption is in Michigan, where the public records act offers
more general protection against disclosures that are considered to be unwar236
231
In Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University,
ranted invasions of privacy.
the court of appeals determined that exemption applied to a magnetic tape that a
state university used to produce a student directory. The court averred that the
state's freedom of infonttation act was not designed to honor a request to de·
velop mailing lists for political purposes when it sought disclosure of student
38
information given to the university for a completely different purpose?
In
reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the similar exemption and rationale
underlying the federal Freedom of Infortnation Act, that disclosure is prohibited
239
if it constitutes an invasion of privacy.
If state sunshine laws are interpreted
232

N.Y. Pus. OFF. LAw§ 87 (McKinney 2001); see also Kryston v. Bd. of Educ., E. Ramapo
Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (FERPA is one of those statutes
that would fit within the statutory exemption).
233

CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6250 (West 2002); Rim of the World Unified Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct.,
129 Cal Rptr. 2d 11, 12;..15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).

234

Rim of the World Unified Sch. Dist., 129 Cal Rptr. 2d at 15; accord Osborn v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 647 N.W.2d 158, 170 (Wis. 2002) (race and gender statistical data
derived from university admissions application is accessible by researcher who is not otherwise
seeking personally identifiable infonnation protected by FERPA, Wis. STAT. § 19.35(1)(9)
(2003)).
235

IND. CODE§ 5-14-3-4 (2001); Unincorporated Operating Div. of Ind. Newspapers v. Trs. of

Ind. Univ., 787 N.E.2d 893, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
236

MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 15.243(13)(1)(a) (2001).

237

294 N.W.2d228, 234-36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), affd, 327 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. 1982).

238

/d. at 236; see also Brent v. Paquette, 567 A.2d 976, 983-84 (N.H. 1989) (students' and
parents' names and addresses exempt from disclosure under state's Right-to-Know statute's exemption against disclosure of infonnation that would constitute an invasion of privacy).
239
Kestenbaum, 294 N.W.2d at 233. FOIA even has express language in it that prohibits access to "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.,' 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000). Additional language protects information that ''could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of person privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C); see generally Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding
Private Lives from prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict between Constitutional Privacy and the
Accountability Principle of Democracy, 11 COMMLAW CoNSPECTUS 71 (2003).
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as impliedly shielding certain information in order to prevent an invasion of
privacy, these statutes may protect an even broader range of inforrnation than
just their specifically enumerated exemptions. Even if student records are not
specifically exempted, they would be impliedly exempted under the public's
reasonable expectation to be free of unwarranted invasions of privacy. Indeed,
the Supreme Court recently expanded FOIA'' s protection to prohibit disclosure
of death-scene photographs that would have invaded the privacy of surviving
240
Hence, the breadth of protection under sunshine laws may
family members .
not be confined to specifically enumerated prohibitions but may cover student
records under a much broader range of protection. This opens the -door to expanded use of the courts by students and their parents.
B.

The Litigation

School districts are- or should be- aware of the dangers involved in
public record requests. Accessing any statutory annotation for any sunshine law
will likely yield reported litig_ation, usually because the government has refused
241
Refusal is often the correct response, but that does not stop the reaccess.
quester from pursuing a lawsuit. Thus, sometimes the public's request for access to school information presents a school district with a no--win situ':ltion. To
that extent, sunshine laws are fraught with more litigation dangers than federal
privacy laws. On the other hand, although the exposure exists, it is somewhat
less exposure to student-initiated litigation.
The genesis of any student-initiated litigation for release of infortnation
under sunshine laws is the inherent clash between the purpose of those laws for
government accountability and the individual citizen's sense that some government records are too private for public disclosure. Courts for nearly a century
have recognized this ''sense'' by formulating remedies for common law invasion
242
of torts, frrst elucidated in the well-known and oft-cited 1890 Harvard Law
243
Review article, The Right to Privacy. The privacy tort most often used for the
240

u.s.
241

Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004), reh'g denied, 541
1057 (2004).

See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552.

242

The four major invasion of privacy torts are found at
652(A) ( 1977):

REsTATEMENT (SECONt>) OF TORTS

§

(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another ... ; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness ... ; or
(c)

unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life ... ; or

(d) publicity that unreasonably placed the other in a false light before the
public ....
243

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy [The implicit made explicit],
4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 75
(Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed. 1984).
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unauthorized release of information is the civil wrong of making private facts
244
public.
Courts have. incorporated these tort concepts. into the analyses of
245
whether or not to release information under sunshine laws.
To the extent
these sunshine laws are in derogation of the common law right of privacy, they
246
might fairly be restricted and applied narrowly.
However, independent tort actions against government agencies solely
for recovery under the tort are few and far between and will rarely be successful
for wrongful disclosure of private information held by the government because
247
of the heavy burden on a plaintiff~
Such actions are made difficult because
the tort usually requires proof that the publicized inforn1ation was not actually a
248
matter of public concem.
The only school records case involving the tort was
not successful. In Louisiana, a school board member obtained and forwarded a
student's records to the state department of education for an investigation into
249
allegations of grade-changing.
The court determined that those actions did
not constitute an invasion of privacy because there was no violation of the stu250
dent's expectation of privacy nor .a n improper public disclosure.
All this is not to suggest that the invasion of privacy tort may not prove
useful in these situations. There are a handful of cases by which individuals
have sued private individuals- as opposed to governmental entities...._ and sue244

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 6520 (1977): "One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." But see Nat' I Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004), reh'g denied~ 541 U.S. 1057 (2004) (holding that photographs of
deceased would constitute an intrusion into the privacy of the family).
REsTATEMENT

245

See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167-70 (2004), reh'g
denied 541 U.S. 1057 (2004); Dept. of Children v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 710 A.2d 1378,
1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Seattle Firefighters v. Hollister, 737 P.2d 130.2, 1305 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987)); accord O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 1989); Doe v.
Unified Sch. Dist., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Kan. 2003).
246

See Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 686 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (contrasting privacy
statute and common law right to privacy); Williams v. Matthews; 448 S.E.2d 625, 628 (Va. 1994)
(statute authorizing seizure of property in derogation of right to privacy). See generally Edmundson v. Rivera, 363 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Conn. 1975); Summers v. Suinmers, 239 N.E.2d 795, 798
(Ill. 1968); Rusinek v. Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co., 309 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Mich. 1981).
247

See, e.g., Rocque v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 774 A.2d 957,962-63 (Conn. 2001).

248

See, e.g., Hatch v. Town of Middletown, 311 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2002); Dept. of Children
v~ Freedom of Info. Co·m m'n, 710 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998). This may well be a
recognition that access to government records also has common law underpinnings. See, e._g.,
Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Providence Journal Co. v. Rodgers,
711 A.2d 1131, 1135 (R.I. 1998).
249
250

Young v. St. Landry Parish Sch. Bd., 673 So. 2d 1272, 1275-76 (La. Ct. App. 1996).

Young, 6"73 So. 2d at 1275-76; see also Doe v. Unified Sch. Dist., 255 F.Supp.2d 1239,
1249-50 (D. Kan. 2003) (school board member's disclosure of information to a single person did
not constitute publicity for privacy tort); accord Williamson ex rel. Williamson v. Keith, 786 So.
2d 390, 396 (Miss. 2003) (school board lawyer not liable for invasion of privacy for subpoenaing
special education records because there was no publicity).

394

[Vol. 108

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
251

ceeded in proving unlawful disclosure of private information.
Under the circumstances, the risk of tort litigation under sunshine laws is pretty minimal,
252
given the large number of cases that do not succeed. However, school officials do risk some hartn from suc·h tort suits even if the plaintiff is unsuccessful,
especially if the suit is instituted against a school official as a private individual
rather than as a public official, even if only in costs and attorney fees.
In the main, sunshine laws have proved effective in protecting student
records. and private information therein on explicit statutory terms. Courts have
usually been assiduous in preventing access to personal information in school
records under sunshine laws. Courts have eve.n gone so far as to engraft tort
notions of privacy in a broader sense to cast a greater protective shadow over
school records. Regardless of the minimal success of the tort itself in matters of
records, the sunshine laws on their own terms have proved successful in providing protection, especially more successful than federal laws .
•

VI. CONCLUSION

School districts ignore their state constitutions, state statutes, and state
regulations governing the privacy of student records at their periL It is easy and
comfortable to follow the federal statutes and regulations and assume they follow the same principles and provide the same protection as state law. They do
not. In many cases, the federal laws conflict with state laws. When the state
laws afford greater rights than the federal laws, the school districts run the serious risk of entangling_themselves in disputes not anticipated by the guidance
and policies formulated by the United States Department of Education. Most
state laws are more restrictive about privacy protections than the federal laws
and have more likelihood of creating litigation problems than federal laws.
The use of state laws to vindicate civil rights in other areas of the law is
beginning to affect the particular vindication of privacy rights. School districts
are familiar with privacy protections under federal law, but not as familiar with
their respective state laws. Although school districts are often the bulwark for
preventing public access under sunshine laws, they must also be attentive to the
more particularized details of state laws. This ~'brave new world" of state litigation is destined to expand as litigants abandon federal remedies for state remedies. This "brave new world" makes familiarity with the "local distinction" of
state privacy laws imperative.

251

E.g., Hill v. MCI World-Com Commc'ns, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1205, l2l3-15 (S.D. Iowa
2001); Pachowitz v. LeDoux, 666 N.W.2d 88, 104 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003), review denied, 671
N.W.2d 849 (Wis. 2003). But see Olson v. Red Cedar Clinic, 681 N.W.2d 306, 308-10 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2004), review denied, 687 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2004) (clinic's transmission of medical records
to school psychologist was not an invasion of privacy under Wisconsin statute because there was
no public disclosure).
252

See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §. 6520 ( 1977) (appendices).

